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Editorial
Machine learning with personal data: is data
protection law smart enough to meet the
challenge?
Christopher Kuner*, Dan Jerker B. Svantesson**, Fred H. Cate***,
Orla Lynskey***, and Christopher Millard***
Almost seven decades after Alan Turing conceived of ‘intel-
ligent machines’, there has recently been a surge of interest
in machine learning and algorithmic decision-making. The
popular imagination has been stirred by high-profile events
such as the victory of IBM’s supercomputer, Watson, in
the US quiz show Jeopardy, and Google Deepmind’s deep
learning program AlphaGo’s victory in the ancient Chinese
game Go. Meanwhile, machine learning processes are be-
ing deployed in contexts as varied as fraud prevention,
medical diagnostics, and the development of autonomous
vehicles. The underlying technologies are increasingly ac-
cessible to data controllers, with major cloud computing
providers including Amazon, IBM, Google, and Microsoft
offering low-cost, scalable, cloud-supported machine learn-
ing services and tools, with a particular focus on data min-
ing and other types of predictive analytics.
Regulation of ‘automated individual decisions’ is not
new to data protection law and was addressed explicitly
in the 1995 Data Protection Directive (DPD).1 The 2016
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) extends
the protection against decisions made solely on the basis
of automated processing to cover not only profiling of
data subjects but also any other form of automated pro-
cessing.2 All of the data protection principles apply to
such processing, but perhaps most significant are the re-
quirements of the first principle, which stipulates that
processing of personal data must be lawful, fair, and
transparent. Although that may appear straightforward,
the practical application to machine learning of each el-
ement of this principle is likely to be challenging.
Article 22(1) of the GDPR gives data subjects the right
not to be subject to decision-making, including profiling,
based solely on automated decision-making that produ-
ces legal effects concerning them or similarly affecting
them. Personal data used for automated decisions, in-
cluding profiling, should only be collected for specified,
explicit, and legitimate purposes, and subsequent pro-
cessing that is incompatible with those purposes is not
permitted. Machine learning is data driven, typically in-
volving both existing data sets and live data streams in
complex training and deployment workflows.3 It may be
difficult to reconcile such dynamic processes with pur-
poses that are specified narrowly in advance.
In terms of lawfulness, Article 22(2) of the GDPR
does contain some specific exemptions from the prohi-
bition on automated decision-making, including con-
tractual necessity and consent. In those cases, however,
Article 22(3) provides that the data controller ‘shall im-
plement suitable measures to safeguard the data sub-
ject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, at
least the right to obtain human intervention on the part
of the controller, to express his or her point of view and
to contest the decision’. Again, this may look simple,
but in practice how can informed consent be obtained
in relation to a process that may be inherently non-
transparent (a ‘black box’)? Even if an algorithmic pro-
cess can in theory be explained, what if it is impossible
to do that in a way that is intelligible to a data subject?
To be sufficiently ‘specific’, will a separate consent be re-
quired for each situation in which personal data are to
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1 Directive 95/46/EC, art 15 and Recital 41. For a helpful analysis of these
provisions, see Lee Bygrave, ‘Automated Profiling, Minding the Machine:
Article 15 of the EC Data Protection Directive and Automated Profiling’,
(2001) 17(1) Computer Law & Security Review17.
2 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, art 22 and Recital 71. art 22 GDPR appears to
be broader in scope than art 15 DPD because the GDPR covers ‘a
decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling’
whereas the DPD covers only ‘a decision . . . which is based solely on au-
tomated processing of data intended to evaluate certain personal aspects
relating to him, such as his performance at work, creditworthiness, reli-
ability, conduct, etc’.
3 Singh and others, ‘Responsibility and Machine Learning: Part of a
Process’, paper delivered at the MCCRC Symposium on Machine
Learning: Technology Law & Policy <https://queenmaryuniversit907-
public.sharepoint.com/Pages/Symposium-2016.aspx>
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be processed for automated decision-making, for exam-
ple, in particular employment, financial, or medical
contexts? As for ‘human intervention’, it may not be
feasible for a human to conduct a meaningful review of
a process that may have involved third-party data and
algorithms (which may contain trade secrets), pre-
learned models, or inherently opaque machine learning
techniques.
In terms of fairness, bias may be introduced into ma-
chine learning processes at various stages, including al-
gorithm design and selection of training data, which
may embed existing prejudices into automated
decision-making processes. For example, under-
representation of a minority group in historic data may
reinforce discrimination against that group in future
hiring processes or credit-scoring. Profiling based on
postal codes or even magazine subscriptions may be-
come a proxy for selection based on race or gender.4
Identifying and controlling for such biases is a critical
challenge in designing and evaluating the fairness of ma-
chine learning processes.
As regards transparency, GDPR Articles 13(2)(f) and
14(2)(g) oblige data controllers to inform data subjects
(at the time of data collection) regarding ‘the existence
of automated decision-making’ and to provide ‘mean-
ingful information about the logic involved, as well as
the significance and the envisaged consequences of such
processing. . .’. Again, it is difficult to see how the sec-
ond part of this requirement can be satisfied, especially
in cases where a machine learning process involves mul-
tiple data sources, dynamic development, and elements
that are opaque, whether for technological or proprie-
tary reasons. Presumably, what will constitute ‘mean-
ingful information’ about ‘logic’ must be evaluated
from the perspective of the data subject. Disclosure of
the full code of algorithms and detailed technical de-
scriptions of machine learning processes are unlikely to
help. A high-level, non-technical, description of the
decision-making process is more likely to be meaning-
ful. There may also be a tension between the right to ge-
neric information about a decision-making process, and
the apparently more specific right ‘to obtain an explana-
tion of the decision reached . . . and to challenge the
decision’ (GDPR, Recital 71). Although not directly
binding, this Recital may embolden regulators and
courts to try to compel data controllers to provide ex-
planations of specific outcomes in particular cases, and
not merely ‘meaningful information’ about ‘logic’ in
general.
So, is data protection law, and in particular the
GDPR, up to the challenge of regulating machine learn-
ing with personal data? Some commentators foresee a
bleak, indeed almost dystopian, future, in which the
growing use of algorithms increases inequality and
threatens democracy.5 Others present a more nuanced
outlook in which automated decision-making, while
not without significant risk, may be made subject to ac-
countability and governance mechanisms that will facil-
itate outcomes in which anticipated benefits outweigh
potential harms. For example, technical tools might be
developed which can be applied to automated decision-
making processes to audit and verify compliance with
data protection and other legal requirements.6
Finally, while considerable attention has been given
to the dangers of embedding unfairness in algorithmic
decision-making processes, it should not be forgotten
that human decision-making is often influenced by bias,
both conscious and unconscious, and even by metabo-
lism.7 Indeed, while it may be extremely difficult to
ensure complete transparency in automated decision-
making processes, even well-intentioned human deci-
sion makers are susceptible to prejudices of which even
they are unaware. This suggests the intriguing possibility
that it may in future be feasible to use an algorithmic
process to demonstrate the lawfulness, fairness, and
transparency of a decision made by either a human or a
machine to a greater extent than is possible via any hu-
man review of the decision in question. In that event,
the current data protection requirement that automated
decisions should be subject to an appeal to a human
may need to be reversed. A right to appeal to a machine
against a decision made by a human may in the end
prove to be the more effective remedy.8
doi:10.1093/idpl/ipx003
4 Joshua Kroll and others, ‘Accountable Algorithms’ (2017) University of
Pennsylvania Law Review (forthcoming). <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id¼2765268##>
5 See, for example, Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction (Allen Lane
2016).
6 Kroll (n) 4.
7 One widely reported study of judges’ behaviour at a parole board in
Israel revealed that it was much more likely for a parole application to be
granted in the early morning or after lunch than in the middle of the day
when the judges were hungry. ‘Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions’
(2011) 108(17) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA
6889.
8 See Dimitra Kamarinou and others, ‘Machine Learning with Personal
Data’, Queen Mary University of London Legal Studies Research Paper
247/2016<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id¼2865811>
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